

Ethics of AI in Radiology: European and North American Multisociety Statement

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1 Summary

2

3 Artificial intelligence (AI), defined as computers that behave in ways that, until recently, were
4 thought to require human intelligence, has the potential to substantially improve all facets of
5 radiology [1]. AI is complex, has numerous potential pitfalls, and is inevitably biased to some
6 degree. Radiologists and all others who build and use radiology AI products have a duty to
7 understand AI deeply, to provide the most benefit to patients, to understand when and how
8 hazards manifest, to be transparent about benefits and risks, and as much as possible to
9 mitigate any harm they might cause. AI will cause dramatic clinical, social and economic
10 changes. Most changes will be positive, but some may be for the worse.

11

12 AI has noticeably altered our perception of radiology data --- their value, how to use them, and
13 how they may be misused. Rather than simply understanding AI, radiologists have a moral duty
14 both to understand their data, and to use the data they collect to improve the common good,
15 extract more information about patients and their diseases, and improve the practice of
16 radiology.

17

18 Bias, a systematic deviation from truth, occurs to some extent with any dataset. This manifests
19 in many different ways, each of which deserves research and awareness in order to minimize
20 the effects on the decisions made by AI models.

21

22 Radiology should start now to develop codes of ethics and practice for AI. Establishing these
23 regulations, standards, and codes of conduct to produce ethical AI will need to balance
24 technical, clinical, and commercial motivations with appropriate moral concern. Ensuring
25 ethical AI requires a desire to gain trust from all involved. Both radiology-centric AI expertise
26 and ethical technology are needed to verify and validate AI products. Key to these codes of
27 conduct will be a continual emphasis on transparency, protection of patients, and vigorous
28 control of data versions and uses. AI tools will need to be monitored continuously and carefully
29 to ensure they work as expected, and that the decisions they make enable optimal, and ethical
30 patient care.

31

32 The radiology community is learning about ethical AI while simultaneously trying to invent and
33 use it. This is occurring in the midst of technological evolution at a speed and scope which are
34 hard to comprehend. AI will conceivably change radiologists' roles and positions, revolutionize
35 how decisions are made about radiology exams, and transform how radiologists relate to
36 patients and other stakeholders.

37

38 Introduction

39

40 This statement arises from the multi-national radiology community's desire to examine the
41 ethics and code of behavior for artificial intelligence (AI) in radiology. Our goals are to foster
42 trust among all parties that radiology AI will do the right thing for patients and the community,
43 and to see these ethical aspirations applied to all aspects of AI in radiology. To encourage
44 research on these topics, we describe ethical issues associated with designing and using
45 autonomous and intelligent systems in radiology for the greater good of patients,
46 understanding how they work, and avoiding harm by their use. To a lesser extent, we examine
47 objectives for regulations and codes of conduct for this field, and illustrate the medical, cultural,
48 and commercial factors which affect the confluence of AI, radiology, and ethics.

49

50 After more than a decade of specialized, advanced training, radiologists acquire the knowledge
51 and skills necessary to analyze radiology images, to discover intimate and often life-altering
52 information about what is occurring inside their patients' bodies. Patients, other customers,
53 and the public rely on radiologists to make decisions based on imaging examinations. This
54 unique decision-making capability creates a hierarchy of authority between radiologists and
55 those who rely on them. Radiologists' professional code of ethics aims to ensure that the
56 authority wielded by radiologists leads to moral outcomes. AI and machine learning (ML) are
57 statistical methods that will increase the information radiologists are able to extract from
58 radiology examinations, enrich radiology decision-making, and improve patient care in
59 radiology.

60

61 Going forward, conclusions about images will be made not just by human radiologists, but in
62 conjunction with intelligent machines. In some instances, the machines may make better
63 decisions, make them more quickly or efficiently, or contradict the human radiologists. AI will
64 affect image interpretation, the what and how of reporting, how we communicate, and how we
65 bill for services, [2, 3]. AI has the potential to alter professional relationships, patient
66 engagement, knowledge hierarchy, and the labor market. Additionally, AI may exacerbate the
67 concentration and imbalance of resources, with entities that have significant AI resources
68 having more "radiology decision-making" capabilities. Radiologists and radiology departments
69 will also *be* data, with AI models categorizing, or grading, radiologists and radiology
70 departments. AI will deduce patterns in personal, professional, and institutional behavior. AI is
71 transforming traditional thinking about radiology data --- how 'truthful' and 'ethical' are the
72 data, who owns them, who has access to them, who knows what, and how they use that
73 power.

74

75 While AI promises to improve quality, patient outcomes, and efficiency, and decrease costs, it
76 will also produce new possibilities, consequences, and questions for both patients and the
77 radiology community. These issues will be shaped as much by the community's ethics as by
78 technical factors. Other effects will be more indirect, such as algorithms that make enterprise
79 or public policy decisions, or find patterns in the data of large populations to improve public
80 health and our understanding of diseases and treatments.

81
82 Radiology has a duty to actively pursue AI and use it to improve radiology. It should also inspect
83 this data-driven, human-plus-machine, decision-making future for unintended consequences
84 that detract from the best patient care. New ethical issues will appear rapidly and regularly, and
85 our appreciation of them will change over time. Thus, while it is important to consider the
86 ethics of AI in radiology now, it will be important to reassess the topic repeatedly as our
87 understanding of its impact and potential grows.

88
89 At the start, most radiology AI will consist of intelligent clinical decision support models
90 integrated into radiologists' workflow, such as measurement tools or computer assisted
91 detection (CAD) already in use today. Increasingly, however, AI agents will be autonomous, and
92 make decisions and initiate actions on their own, without radiologists' supervision.

93
94 Extrapolating from other industries and looking far into the future, AI-enabled radiology will
95 mature into a complex environment containing dynamic networked systems [4]. These intricate
96 webs of autonomous algorithms will be similar to multiple radiologists each making decisions
97 about one focused portion of an exam. Depending on their consensus, they will then pass the
98 examination to other groups of autonomous algorithms, which, in turn will make decisions on
99 other parts of the exam. Complex, web-like cascades of these decision-making computers will
100 accept and transmit information to each other, and will change over time.

101
102 Dynamic networked systems for radiology have barely been conceived, and are years from
103 being designed or built. Much remains to be learned about how to assemble such systems in a
104 robust, secure, accurate, and reliable fashion, or how to understand their "behavior", or
105 processing logic.

106
107 Radiologists, who will remain ultimately responsible for what happens to patients, will need to
108 acquire new skills to manage these ecosystems and ensure patients' well-being. The radiology
109 community needs an ethical framework to help steer technological development, influence
110 how different stakeholders respond to and use AI, and implement these tools to make best
111 decisions and actions for, and increasingly with, patients.

112 Because some AI models are relatively easy to build and train, research and commercial AI-
113 powered solutions are being produced by a large number of sometimes naive or unprofessional
114 actors. This increases the importance of extending existing ethical codes in medicine, statistics,
115 and computer science to consider situations specific to radiology AI [5–7].
116

117 Many fields outside medicine, and medical societies, are evaluating the ethics of AI. Recent
118 New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) and Journal of the American Medical Association
119 (JAMA) articles describe both the promise of AI [8] and the acute need to address the potential
120 for bias and questions about the fiduciary relationship between patients and AI [9, 10]. Leaders
121 in computer science and engineering, including the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
122 Engineers (IEEE), the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Future of Life Institute, and
123 governmental bodies such the European Commission’s Group on Ethics in Science and New
124 Technologies, are updating their recommendations and guidance [11–14].

125 About this Statement

126 This statement is a joint effort by the American College of Radiology, European Society of
127 Radiology, Radiology Society of North America, Society for Imaging Informatics in Medicine,
128 European Society of Medical Imaging Informatics, Canadian Association of Radiologists, and
129 American Association of Physicists in Medicine. The core writing team includes an American
130 philosopher, North American and European radiologists, imaging informaticists, medical
131 physicists, patient advocates, and attorneys with experience in radiology in the U.S. and EU.
132

133 *This preliminary draft is not specifically endorsed by any of the sponsoring societies.* We hereby
134 release this draft and invite all interested parties to submit comments about both the
135 statement and ethical issues relevant to radiology. We encourage comments from patients and
136 others who may be affected by this technology. We appreciate the experts in ethics, law, and
137 data science who have expressed interest in this topic, and we look forward to your remarks.
138 Based on comments received, we expect to release a final statement approximately six months
139 after the close of the comment period on Sunday, April 7, 2019.
140

141 In developing this statement, we reviewed current ethics literature from computer science and
142 medicine, as well as historical ethical scholarship, and material related to the ethics of future
143 scenarios. In the interest of efficiency, our statement focuses on North America and Europe.
144 We realize that other regions may have values and ethics which both overlap and differ.
145

146 This statement is intended to be aspirational rather than prescriptive. We aim to provide an
147 approach to the ethics of AI that is easy to understand and implement. We expect this topic will

148 change rapidly as technology and data science advances, and new legal approaches and liability
149 descriptions evolve to deal with automated decision making. California’s new data privacy law
150 [15, 16] and the European Union’s GDPR [17] and proposed Civil Law Rules on Robotics [18] are
151 harbingers of such legislation. People who build commercial and generalizable radiology AI
152 tools need instructive ethical guidance; this statement will help inform future groups charged
153 with composing such regulations. In this draft we have not provided many practical
154 recommendations, though we expect to include more of them in the final version.

155
156 Ethical use of AI in radiology must respect the ethical principles of humanity, the protection of
157 human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research [19], and mandates of public reason.
158 Some of radiology’s ethical issues are deep and difficult; in those cases we try to raise
159 awareness of what we regard to be the most pressing ethical issues, explain how the issues
160 specifically involve radiology, and suggest factors the radiology community should consider.
161 Where we identify ethical issues that pertain specifically to radiology and whose answers are,
162 sufficiently clear, we will suggest strategies.

163
164 This statement is structured using a process described by Floridi et al., [5]. The ethics topics are
165 divided into ethics of data, ethics of algorithms, and ethics of practice.

166 Ethics of Data

167 The ethics of data are fundamental to AI in radiology. Key areas of data ethics include informed
168 consent, privacy and data protection, bias and data “truthfulness,” ownership, objectivity,
169 transparency, and the gap between those who have or lack the resources to use large datasets.
170 Other data issues include bias against group-level subsets on the basis of gender, ethnic, or
171 economic group, the importance of trust in assessing data ethics, and providing meaningful and
172 moral access rights to data [6].

173
174 AI has dramatically altered our perception of radiology examinations and associated data ---
175 their value, how we use them and how they may be misused. As much as understanding AI,
176 radiologists have a moral duty to understand their data. Radiologists and the radiology
177 community have a moral duty to use the data they collect to improve the common good,
178 extract more information about patients and their diseases, and improve the practice of
179 radiology. Radiologists are ethically obligated to make their data useful to the patients from
180 whom they collected it.

181 Clinical radiology data

182 An imaging examination typically consists of image data and associated labels [20].

183

184 Image data are produced by a piece of imaging equipment, and subsequently processed to
185 generate human-viewable and -interpretable images. The raw data produced by the imaging
186 modality cannot be interpreted by humans, and must be converted into collections of pixels,
187 which we commonly refer to as an image. Pixels are the “dots” that form the images that
188 humans evaluate. While the pixel data are saved, and often combined with additional meta-
189 data, raw data is usually purged after a short period of time (e.g., 72 hours). In some instances,
190 such as with ultrasound images, meta-data (such as patient information) can be embedded
191 within the pixel data. This is commonly referred to as “burned-in” metadata. While most image-
192 based AI efforts currently use pixel data, there are efforts underway to process raw data, as it
193 sometimes holds more information than pixel data [8].

194

195 Labels add further context, information, and value to image data. They can be study-level
196 descriptors (e.g., this is an abdominal MRI) or image-level descriptors (e.g., on image 36, these
197 pixels represent the liver). The radiology report that accompanies the images and indicates the
198 findings, interpretation, and diagnosis that results from the images commonly serves as a
199 source of labels. Labels can include:

200

- Radiology report findings, including common data elements (CDEs)[21]

201

- Image annotations, such as arrows, measurements, and regions of interest on the images

202

203

- Extra labeling done specifically for data to be used for AI

204

- Non-image clinical data, including documentation from the electronic health record (EHR), pathology, laboratory, genomics, and other data

205

206

- Social media and other publicly available data, such as weather data and public maps

207

208

- Other data generated by patients, public and the Internet of Things (IoT)

209

210 The performance of an image-based AI system depends on the diversity of the pixel data, and
211 the precision and accuracy of the labels. The radiology community can increase the quality of AI
212 systems through standardization of annotations and measurements; traceability; data version
213 control; documenting processes that alter, move, or store data; and correlation to patient
214 outcomes and related meta-data [20].

215 Business operational and analytic data

216 Business operational data include data on customer transactions, employee tasks, resource
217 utilization, and business processes. Information technology (IT) operational data include
218 information on what, and how well, technology components are operating. Business/IT analytic
219 data include data about speed and accuracy of IT processes, security and risk of the business-
220 technological ecosystem, and measures of data integrity, validation, correlation, business
221 efficiency, and productivity. Report turnaround time, relative value units (RVUs), scanner
222 utilization, and quality measures are common examples of these data in clinical radiology.

223 Pre-training, synthetic, and augmented data

224 The performance of AI models improves as they are trained on more data. Excitement about
225 the accuracy of AI models for perceptive tasks outside of medical imaging came from using
226 datasets of millions or even tens of millions of images. By contrast, currently available radiology
227 datasets for AI contain between hundreds to tens of thousands of radiology examinations. As a
228 result, the algorithms that drive radiology AI models are either typically pre-trained on large
229 sets of non-medical image data, such as ImageNet (which has over 14 million labeled images of
230 typical objects such as dogs, cars, and mountains), or use synthetic or augmented data [22, 23].
231 The process of applying models trained on one type of data to a different type of data is called
232 transfer learning.

233
234 One approach to expand data for training is to use fully or partially artificial data, commonly
235 referred to as synthetic data. Synthetic data are generated at least in part by statistical
236 programs, to randomize their features. Once the model to produce them is developed,
237 generating synthetic data is fast and inexpensive. Synthetic data are useful for pre-training [24].
238 There is no risk of potential compromise of patient data with synthetic data, since the data are not
239 obtained from real patients. For radiology, synthetic data can mimic rare diseases, allowing the
240 algorithms to train on more exams showing the pathology when such exams are hard to obtain
241 from actual patients. They are also useful for researchers, when no data exist, or to generate
242 data to test and verify AI products. Synthetic data are often used as adversarial images in
243 adversarial networks, a class of AI algorithms [25].

244
245 Augmented image data are real data that are copied, with each copy altered in some way to
246 make it different [26]. Common augmentations include rotation, flipping, translation, resizing,
247 adding noise, or sharpening. Augmented data are useful when the algorithm to be trained can
248 identify the object despite such changes. Often, augmented data are easier to generate than
249 synthetic data, though augmented data may still have privacy and data use restrictions.

250

251 Synthetic and augmented data help fill in gaps in real data and are useful to improve reporting
252 and selection biases, but they may also exaggerate bias [27] if they duplicate or reinforce a
253 systemic bias in the baseline data used to generate them. While it is clear that these data are
254 useful in training algorithms, much more research is needed to understand the ramifications
255 and limits of using large amounts of artificial data in radiology, and the criteria for their use.

256 Raw image data

257 Raw data are usually proprietary to companies that build imaging equipment, such as CT
258 scanners. They are largely uninterpretable by humans. When digital radiology first appeared,
259 digital data storage was expensive. As such, only data in forms thought to be clinically useful
260 were saved, and the raw data was rarely saved for more than a short period of time after
261 images were acquired and interpreted. Theoretically, AI can find features in raw data more
262 robustly than from data that have been processed into human-interpretable images. Because of
263 this, the radiology community is increasingly recognizing the value of raw data. Patients,
264 industry, and researchers will benefit if raw image data are saved and made accessible in
265 addition to traditional, post-processed image data [20].

266 Data ownership

267 Healthcare entities collect and protect patients' medical images and associated health
268 information. Now, with robust methods to share data electronically and the need to aggregate
269 data for AI, medical imaging data are increasingly being shared among radiologists, other
270 healthcare workers, institutions, and even countries. Ethical and technical issues to secure data
271 are complicated, especially as ethical norms and laws vary among countries. This complexity
272 and variation hinder sharing of patient data for clinical care, AI research, and commercial
273 development.

274 On the surface, "Who owns patient data?" is a concept that radiologists, the greater medical
275 community, and regulatory bodies have already addressed. Data ownership varies among
276 countries. In the U.S., the entity that performs the imaging becomes the owner, though
277 patients have a legal right to a copy of the imaging data. While practices are heterogeneous,
278 many hospitals include permission to use data retrospectively for research in their general
279 consent to treatment, which has been shown to be accepted by patients [28]. In the U.S.,
280 federal law does not require consent for de-identified retrospective studies as defined in the
281 following excerpt from 45 CFR 46 (2018 version)

282 (ii) Information, which may include information about biospecimens, is recorded by the
283 investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects cannot readily be

284 ascertained directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, the investigator does
285 not contact the subjects, and the investigator will not re-identify subjects [19];

286 By comparison, in the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) specifically states
287 that patients own and control their sensitive, personal, and/or identifiable data (both medical
288 and non-medical). The GDPR requires explicit patient consent to reuse or share data, and
289 patients may withdraw their consent at any time [17]. Each EU country has a national body
290 responsible for protecting personal data [29]. A new EU-based initiative is actively asking
291 patients to donate their data after undergoing an imaging exam and securing a diagnosis [30].
292 Sites where radiology examinations are performed are also subject to ownership and copyright
293 regulation, suggesting that approval to use radiology data will require approval by both patients
294 and imaging facilities.

295 In Canada, healthcare providers that produce medical images own the physical record, and
296 patients have a right to access it [31]. Healthcare delivery is under provincial rather than federal
297 jurisdiction, and varies between Canadian provinces [32, 33] The recent Tri-Council Policy
298 Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans [34] states that “consent is not
299 required for research that relies exclusively on secondary use of non-identifiable information,”
300 a position held by Canada's largest research agencies that will facilitate AI research there.

301
302 While legal discussions on data privacy and ownership questions are outside the purview of this
303 statement, they illustrate the need for new discussions on who owns what data; and if data are
304 transferred, used and reused, who pays whom for what. In other words, might the owner of the
305 imaging machine own the pixel data, while the radiologists own the labels (including reports,
306 annotations, or other information they contribute to the value of an exam)? Until recently,
307 most medical image data sharing and aggregation was for research purposes, and governed by
308 mature policies. But if the value of medical imaging data comes from having both parts --- pixels
309 and labels --- and that bundle is significantly more valuable than either part separately, who
310 receives that value is yet to be determined.

311 Data sharing and data use

312 From search engines to word processors to digital assistants, the dislocation of data value has
313 disrupted the business model. Traditional products are built less to provide services and rather
314 as portals to collect, capitalize on, and profit from data. This paradigm has the potential to
315 occur in medicine and radiology.

316

317 As medical data become more valuable, the line between academic and commercial uses of
318 data is blurring. For example, suppose a hospital sells exclusive rights to their imaging data to a
319 company hoping to build a valuable AI product. Since patients also retain the right to access
320 their data, can they, in turn, sell their data to another company that wants to build an AI
321 product? Or may they refuse to share their data for commercial development but allow it for
322 non-profit research? Many governmental and other funding sources now require applicants to
323 share their data; how will this be reconciled with exclusive data use agreements? Legislators
324 and regulators need to revisit the policies that concern the use of medical data in academic and
325 commercial settings, finding an equitable balance between the interests of society at large and
326 the interests of the individual patients who generate the data [35].

327
328 The skyrocketing value of radiology data is disrupting traditional data-sharing practice, and
329 buying and selling of radiology data is becoming more common. New deals for commerce in
330 medical data may be influenced by naiveté or greed. For example, in 2015, the Royal Free
331 National Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trust signed an agreement with DeepMind Health,
332 giving the company access to 1.6 million personal identifiable records at no charge. It was
333 suggested later that the NHS was “seduced by the magic of the algorithm company and in
334 future should at least seek more control over the data and their transparency. What [the NHS]
335 did not realize is they were the ones with the really important thing, which is the dataset.” [36]

336
337 Open, freely accessible data offer enormous benefits for the greater good of patients, society,
338 and the economy. It is naive, however, to expect data owners to give away valuable resources
339 for free. During the 2018 annual meeting of the French Radiological Society (SFR), the
340 foundation of an AI ecosystem called “DRIM France IA” was announced. The idea is to build a
341 qualified database of more than 100 million medical images within a period of 5 years, which
342 can be used by companies willing to develop AI tools that will be made freely available to
343 France’s hospitals and radiologists. At the least, countries should develop a consensus regarding
344 what sorts of data sharing is legitimate, and explore how data producers, owners, managers,
345 and users can share data safely and equitably.

346
347 Release of information and data use agreements (DUA) are critical tools to ensure that data are
348 used transparently and ethically. DUAs explicitly specify what the involved parties can and
349 cannot do with a dataset, and how they must dispose of the data once the agreement ends.
350 DUAs must be updated regularly to reflect new uses of patient data. Data may be considered
351 entities unto themselves. Data flexibility influences their value. The more they can be
352 repurposed, combined, and shared, the more valuable they become. As these changes occur,
353 each data state should be documented. DUAs may include limitations on certain instances of
354 reuse, to avoid breaches of privacy and biases in training algorithms. Subsequent DUAs need to

355 include version control specifications, particularly when data are used to train, test or validate
356 AI models. They will include new and more comprehensive rules for data reuse and intellectual
357 property. The entities receiving the data should take responsibility to identify the origins of
358 those data and fully understand the permissions and rules attached to them. It has been
359 suggested that each patient sign a DUA with any third-party entity that contributes to their
360 digital health record, to encode data quality, security and use for all contributors and users [37].
361 Another approach is dynamic consent, an electronic process which allows ongoing
362 communication between researchers and research participants [38].

363

364 We specifically note DUAs that include exclusive use of data are unethical, because such
365 agreements may remove a significant amount of useful radiology data from general use. They
366 can exacerbate concentration of power, and erode transparency. Exclusive data access
367 contracts are contrary to the common good.

368

369 Institutional review board (IRB) requirements also need to reflect new uses for patient data.
370 Some IRBs, particularly outside the U.S., waive consent requirements when they are not
371 feasible or impede validation of a research study or AI model. When might patient privacy and
372 consent not be absolute, and patient's interests be overridden, when risks are low and there is
373 a compelling public interest to use the data for the greater good [39]? If this occurs, patients
374 should be made aware.

375

376 The need for a robust technical infrastructure to share and manage medical data is driving new
377 supporting technology. In particular, blockchain models theoretically provide a strong,
378 comprehensive method for individuals and entities to securely aggregate and easily access
379 medical data across disparate sites [40, 41]. Details and issues of this technology are outside
380 the scope of this Statement.

381

382 In the interest of full transparency and trust, it would be beneficial to provide a framework to
383 recognize the value of patient data and provide guidelines for different use cases.

384 What must radiology do to gain patients' trust that their data are being used appropriately?

385 How should radiology help patients understand if they have any claim on the monetary or other
386 value of their data? Claims on monetary value are based more on legal precedent than ethics,
387 and vary by country. Most patients are willing to have their data shared [42], and presumably
388 trust it will be used appropriately. The purpose of data sharing, such as for research versus
389 commercial product development, changes patients' willingness to share data [43]. This may
390 not hold in the future, however, if breaches in research data compromise patient privacy or as
391 patients realize the monetary value of their data [44].

392

393 Increasingly, individual patient data are being collected outside of formal healthcare settings.
394 Patients and the public may be invited to share [30, 45], or even sell, their radiology
395 examinations. Today there is no consensus on consent agreements or contracting rules for how
396 these data may be used and reused, nor are there requirements to notify patients how their
397 data are being used, or by whom.

398
399 Patients have large amounts of easily identifiable data outside of radiology. These include other
400 medical data from their health record, pathology and genomics, data from cell phones and
401 personal health and exercise tracking devices, internet search history, socioeconomic data,
402 location tracking, video cameras, and environmental data such as weather records. These data,
403 many of which are publicly available, can theoretically be aggregated to provide broad and
404 deep “360-degree” views of patients. These integrated data may enable more accurate
405 diagnosis and treatment options for individuals, but they are nearly impossible to de-identify
406 and carry significant privacy risks.

407
408 Patients seldom know where their data go. An important way to establish trust is through
409 transparency. Making patients fully aware of an entity’s data practices, and ensuring that they
410 can learn about, participate in, and in some cases even dictate the collection and use of their
411 data, builds customer confidence and has the added benefit of greater brand loyalty. Doing this
412 will also require the entity to understand its goals for sharing or reusing data, which is
413 important for any ethical data use and especially important for AI development. Some of this
414 relies on context; if patients find their data used in a context where they do not expect to find
415 it, the patient’s surprise can quickly change to mistrust.

416 Data privacy

417 The right to privacy has been defined as the right “to be let alone,” and to be free of
418 surveillance by other people or entities [46]. In this setting, only authorized individuals should
419 have access to patient data. All reasonable efforts should be made to preserve this privacy,
420 particularly as data are reused and move through chains of ownership and responsibility.

421
422 In the U.S., the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) defines strict privacy
423 policies for patient identifiers considered protected health information (PHI). Because of this,
424 data often are de-identified or anonymized, which obscures or removes identifiers from health
425 information before being used for research or commerce [47]. Medical images pose unique de-
426 identification issues. For example, images of the head and neck can be reconstructed into 3D
427 models of patients that can be fed into facial recognition software [48]. Radiographs may
428 incidentally include identifying information on bracelets or necklaces, or serial numbers on

429 implanted devices such as pacemakers or defibrillators [49]. Ultrasounds may have identifying
430 information burned into the image pixels. Radiology images also include extensive metadata,
431 some of which identify the patient. Private DICOM tags, used in a proprietary fashion by
432 vendors and therefore frequently undocumented, may unexpectedly hold information that
433 identifies patients, institutions, or the patient's disease.

434

435 When one uses these data to extract features and train AI algorithms, the model may train on
436 these data, and then not generalize when those data are unavailable in other settings. At the
437 moment, true de-identification of radiology examinations requires additional steps beyond
438 deletion and replacement of the content of DICOM tags, and may necessitate manual review of
439 images by humans. Some academic centers in the U.S. prohibit public sharing of data until two
440 individuals have manually reviewed and cleared each item to be shared.

441

442 Despite de-identifying radiology exams and other medical data by rigorous traditional means,
443 these practices are not absolute. Using a 360-degree approach described previously, entities
444 facile with manipulating massive data can likely re-identify just about any radiology exam [50].
445 It is technically feasible for a large social media company to gather data from smartphone and
446 personal devices, along with online search history, and purchase and match these with
447 healthcare data. They could then advertise to those individuals, or sell those data to anyone
448 from insurance companies to hospitals and nursing homes. Radiology groups might find those
449 data valuable to identify patients who need future imaging. This sort of all-encompassing
450 information access further underlines the need for and importance of data security. There is
451 always the risk that bad actors with access to medical data could extort patients who have
452 aspects of their medical history that they wish to remain private.

453

454 Ethical practitioners will make data as private and secure as possible, while also being
455 transparent that one should assume that medical data may not ever be absolutely private.
456 Perfect anonymization is challenging at best.

457

458 Data used to train algorithms presents another new concept for data exposure. Commonly used
459 deep-learning approaches often incorporate details about the training data. The algorithm's
460 behavior may inadvertently disclose these elements [51]. More nefariously, algorithms can be
461 intentionally designed to leak sensitive data, a process known as intentionally back-dooring
462 [52]. Thus, artificial intelligence deployments should be treated as any other software
463 acquisition and adhere to institutional security policies.

464 Bias and data

465 Bias is a systematic deviation from the truth. Bias caused by data occurs when the sampled data
466 do not represent the truth. Types of bias most common in radiology AI include reporting,
467 selection, and automation. Automation bias will be discussed in the Ethics of Practice section.
468

469 Reporting bias is when the reported, or presented, data do not completely represent the real
470 world because data are selectively disclosed. In medicine, this may come from clinical data
471 being more available for positive research findings, or from those same data being duplicated
472 or over-reported. On the other hand, data from negative studies are often under-reported. It
473 also occurs when prototypical data are assumed, for example, describing bananas without
474 noting their color as yellow, because it is assumed bananas are yellow unless otherwise noted
475 [53].
476

477 Selection bias or sampling bias occurs when the sample does not represent the population
478 accurately [54]. Often this is a result of using available or interesting data. Using data from one
479 institution to train an AI model, for example, may accurately represent the population of that
480 institution, but not the more general population for which the model is intended. It may
481 inadvertently discriminate against under-represented subsets of the population [55].
482

483 Selection bias may occur overtly or inadvertently. For example, if all the images for a radiology
484 AI algorithm on a particular disease come from a cohort based on a set of features different
485 from what represents the entire population on which the algorithm will be used, it may
486 systematically give the incorrect answer for individuals who do not match the training group's
487 features. Depending on the question to be answered, relevant features range from physical and
488 health characteristics such as age, sex, weight, height, and genetic and medical history to
489 economic, ethnic, and educational features. Because AI often utilizes larger amounts of data
490 and extracts features at a more granular level than humans, it is often difficult to know in
491 advance which features of a training group may bias or otherwise result in a clinically unethical
492 AI model.
493

494 Dataset shift (DS), a subset of selection bias, is one of the most important barriers to
495 widespread AI use today. DS exists in most radiology settings because image data used for
496 training does not accurately reproduce the conditions of future imaging studies. This includes
497 bias introduced by experimental design, such as the use of synthetic or augmented data. In
498 other words, previous exposure to training is inadequate for the model to make accurate
499 predictions in new situations [56]. While radiologists commonly notice and adapt to differences
500 in images due to slice thickness, scanner brand, field strength, gradient strength, or contrast

501 timing without affecting image interpretation, AI generally lacks that ability. For example, if an
502 AI agent is trained only on images from a 3 Tesla MRI, it may or may not generate the same
503 results on examinations performed at 1.5 Tesla. Similar situations exist for each of the
504 parameters above. One approach to mitigate DS is to have comprehensive training, validation,
505 and test sets. This is the approach taken in the InSight sepsis detection system [57, 58]. A
506 second solution is to develop mathematical processes to recognize, normalize, and transform
507 data to minimize DS.

508

509 Some types of dataset bias occur commonly enough that algorithms can distinguish between
510 different datasets. Manually selected data fundamentally include more bias than data chosen
511 randomly or automatically. Curation bias may occur when humans can choose from which
512 angles to take images, which commonly occurs in ultrasound. Negative set bias arises when
513 datasets over-represent positive or otherwise interesting examinations. This is particularly
514 complex for radiology, where the vast majority of exams are normal. One then needs to balance
515 collecting enough examples of pathology without aberrantly biasing the algorithm. When
516 synthetic or augmented data are used to generate enough examples of rare pathology, they
517 may inappropriately bias the dataset.

518

519 Radiology data are often unbalanced, meaning they have many cases of some categories,
520 particularly normal examinations, and few cases of pathology. In unbalanced datasets,
521 categories may be undersampled or oversampled in an attempt to improve model performance
522 or runtime, and this may introduce bias.

523

524 Bias is sometimes thought of as ethically neutral, as a tendency to produce differential
525 outcomes. In this scenario, bias could be beneficial. If health systems currently deliver subpar
526 care to certain sub-populations disproportionately, there may be an opportunity to rectify that
527 inequity using AI tools that prioritize good health outcomes for all patients or sub-populations.
528 We believe, however, that it is best to think of bias as a negative thing, and the ethical
529 approach in radiology AI is to minimize bias.

530 Data labeling and ground truth

531 AI models in clinical radiology today use supervised ML, where the model learns to match given
532 labels to given images well enough that when the model sees new images, it accurately predicts
533 what label to match to the new images. This is most useful when labels match ground truth,
534 which is the truth about the state of the patient and the patient's pathology or lack thereof.

535

536 Defining ground truth in medical imaging is problematic. For example, an AI model could be
537 trained to recognize a fracture of the scaphoid bone in the wrist. The ground truth labels to
538 train the AI model may come from a radiologist labeling the images as yes or no for fracture.
539 Some fractures are too subtle to see on the initial examination, or the fracture might be visible
540 but missed by the radiologist. For the clinical setting of a question of fracture of the scaphoid, a
541 small but significant bone in the wrist, if the initial X-ray is read as normal and the patient still
542 has pain two weeks later, the exam is repeated to look for a fracture which may have been
543 occult initially but is typically easier to detect on the later exam. Would the initial report be
544 accepted as ground truth, or in this case would ground truth include a check to see if repeat X-
545 rays were done later, and what they showed? In other words, what clinical outcome is most
546 important? For some radiology examinations, the ground truth label will come not from a
547 radiology report, but rather from a combination of subsequent imaging, physical exam findings,
548 surgical outcomes, pathology results, genetic analysis, and other clinical data.

549
550 Not only will a radiologist fail to label 100 percent of examinations correctly, they may label
551 exams differently the next day, or from another radiologist. Ground truth using qualitative
552 scoring by a single expert may be confounded due to this intra- and inter-observer variability.
553 Interpretation by more than one radiologist improves label accuracy [59]. If three radiologists
554 were to evaluate each examination, one could formulate ground truth from their majority or
555 consensus interpretation; in practice, though, this is prohibitively expensive.

556
557 Alternatively, semi-quantitative scoring systems can be developed to determine an imaging
558 ground truth, with rigorous rules set out in scoring atlases and with assessments performed by
559 multiple readers. Formal techniques to evaluate image-based scoring systems such as these
560 include the OMERACT Filter [60]. An AI system might be deemed successful if it performs at
561 least as well as other human expert readers at one of these scoring tasks. For the scaphoid
562 fracture, a semi-quantitative grading system might assign a score based on features such as
563 cortical interruption, presence of lucent line, change in bone density, and how the other wrist
564 bones are aligned.

565
566 This illustrates the multiple challenges in defining the ground truth labeled data to train AI
567 algorithms. What should it be based on, and who should determine that? To avoid deep-
568 seated biases, the answers will depend on the specific task, and need to be carefully considered
569 and defined *a priori*.

570
571 An ethical approach suggests one should weigh the need for improved ground truth labels
572 against the feasibility and cost, and provide transparency about how ground truth is
573 determined for each dataset. This suggests that radiology (and medicine) would be well served

574 by standards for discovery and reporting of dataset bias. The radiology community should ask
575 questions about their data, and be transparent about the data evaluation process and the
576 answers to these questions. This is particularly important when using publicly available datasets
577 for training, as researchers may be unaware of assumptions or hidden bias within the data.

578

579 When an AI model is introduced, those responsible should be able to answer these questions
580 and others like them:

581

582 ● What kinds of bias might exist in your data?

583 ● What have you done to evaluate if your data are biased, and how it may affect your
584 model?

585 ● What are the possible risks that might arise from biases in your data, and what steps
586 have you taken to mitigate these biases?

587 ● What bias might remain, and how should users take remaining biases into account?

588 ● Is your method of ground truth labeling appropriate to the clinical use case you are
589 trying to resolve?

590 Ethics of Algorithms and Trained Models

591 At its core, AI employs classification systems to come to a result. The first and perhaps simplest
592 approach to AI is formal logic: "If an otherwise healthy patient has a fever, then they may have
593 an infection." A second approach is probabilistic, or Bayesian, inference: "If the patient has a
594 fever, adjust the probability they have an infection to X%." A third approach generalizes from
595 similarities to make new predictions: "After analyzing the records of patients whose
596 temperature, symptoms, age, and other factors mostly match the current patient, X% of those
597 patients had an infection." A fourth approach mirrors the function of a neuron: a neural
598 network approach (e.g., deep learning) alters the strengths of connections between neurons
599 based on the training data.

600 Machines making decisions

601 Decision-making is the selection of a belief or a course of action among multiple alternatives.
602 The decision may trigger an action. Human decision-making is the process of choosing
603 alternatives based on the person's knowledge, values, preferences, and beliefs. AI agents
604 choose alternatives based on features in the input data. For supervised learning, the algorithm
605 chooses that alternative based on prior training to match data features to labels. Labels are
606 commonly where human values, preferences, and beliefs may be transferred to the machine,
607 and frequently where transferred human bias manifests itself.

608
609 While AI performs well with classification tasks, it struggles with abstract concepts such as
610 fairness and equality [13]. Additionally, fair use of, or access to, AI is not intrinsic to the AI.
611 Responsibility for these concepts falls to humans, who must anticipate how rapidly-changing AI
612 models may perform incorrectly or be misused, and to protect against these possible outcomes,
613 ideally before they occur [61].

614
615 AI models consist of the algorithm and the data on which they were trained. To reconstruct
616 algorithm development and testing requires saving, or having the ability to reconstitute, exact
617 versions of the datasets used. In theory, AI models can be built to change continuously based
618 on learning from new data. Current AI models are trained on a carefully crafted dataset, and
619 then frozen for implementation. If the model is responsible for a high-risk decision, it is unlikely
620 that the incremental benefits from continuous training will outweigh the risk of unintended
621 performance declines. This process of freezing and documenting each working version of an
622 model is standard practice (version control), but until now such rigor has not applied to training
623 data. Similarly, other common software quality control policies and best practices for ethical
624 software management may now apply to data. This is a critical issue, as it will be almost
625 impossible to find root cause and provide corrective action for performance failures without
626 knowledge of exact data used.

627 Algorithm selection

628 The first steps of developing any AI solution are: understanding the training data, defining
629 model assumptions, and critically evaluating for bias. Choosing an algorithm depends on the
630 size, quality, and nature of the data, available computational time, and the task to be
631 performed. Some algorithms work better with smaller sample sets, while others require
632 numerous examples. For image recognition purposes, convolutional neural networks (CNN)
633 have shown some of the most promising results. Developers select algorithm structures (e.g.,
634 linear vs. non-linear) based on assumptions or analysis of the training data. Ethical issues,
635 beyond understanding which algorithm type best suits the situation, include consideration of
636 what algorithm might give the most useful output for patient care, balanced against limited
637 computing resources or the amount and type of training data available.

638
639 The objective of a model can also introduce bias. When selecting trained models, radiologists
640 should consider possible unintended consequences, and evaluate the fairness of the model's
641 performance across multiple patient groups. This is best done by ensuring that data the model
642 will analyze in practice matches the training and test data used to validate the model's

643 performance. This process is similar to applying evidence-based medicine principles when
644 considering the results of a diagnostic test or choosing a treatment.

645
646 Due to lack of adequate personnel to develop and train AI algorithms and increasing algorithm
647 complexity, a new field of automated ML algorithms, called AutoML, is developing. AutoML
648 allows domain experts such as practicing radiologists, with limited technical computer science
649 skill, to build and train AI. While this has potential to improve democratization of AI, unskilled
650 trainers may be unaware of complexity and potential pitfalls due to the black box nature of AI
651 models. As radiologists become increasingly responsible to create and supervise AI, they should
652 learn enough to understand the ways AI may be unethical, biased, or otherwise not work as
653 intended.

654 Algorithm training

655 Once an algorithm has been trained on a dataset, it becomes a ML model. This step by itself
656 may introduce bias, as the algorithm inherits decisions made from data selection and
657 preparation. To minimize bias, particularly dataset shift, and maximize benefits for patients, it is
658 critically important to train models with datasets that truly represent data the model will see
659 when it is installed in a radiology practice. Often this requires training across multiple
660 institutions and diverse datasets. In light of the known challenges of data sharing, multiple
661 obstacles can limit AI training. If legal and privacy barriers to train a model across multiple
662 datasets are significant, developers may opt for the minimum model training required for FDA
663 certification. One helpful approach is to share model weights and parameters between
664 institutions, rather than data, since the former are not governed by patient privacy regulations.

665 Model evaluation and testing

666 Once the model is trained, it is tested with different data to see how well it works, and
667 potentially how it handles atypical input data or data that it would not be expected to process
668 well. Model testing includes selecting the right test data, defining metrics to evaluate model
669 results, and determining who performs testing. Model evaluation may include both a validation
670 phase and a testing phase. During validation, data different from the training set are repeatedly
671 shown to the model and it is refined. However, the eventual testing phase should present a
672 third, separate dataset to which the model has not been previously exposed, and it is the
673 model's performance on this dataset that should be reported.

674
675 For any supervised technique, the choice of ground truth against which the AI model is to be
676 evaluated must be selected, potentially including imaging features and/or outcomes as
677 discussed above in Ethics of Data. Even after ground truth has been selected, ethical difficulties

678 arise. For example, when faced with clinical situations where there is a high level of uncertainty,
679 humans tend to err on the side of caution, such as a study where it was difficult to separate
680 benign and malignant skin lesions, and doctors over-diagnosed malignancy [62].

681
682 During the testing process, data should be checked to ensure it matches the deployment
683 context. It may be necessary to perform baseline statistics on the training and testing data to
684 understand disease distribution. The confusion matrix defined as $(TN + TP + FP + FN)$ is
685 commonly used for binary classification problems (Figure 1).

		Predicted Class	
		Yes	No
Actual Class	Yes	TP	FN
	No	FP	TN

688
689
690 Figure 1. Confusion matrix showing the instances in a predicted class versus instances in the
691 actual class. From this table it is easy to see how often classes are mislabeled. TP=true positives,
692 TN=true negatives, FP=false positives, and FN=false negatives. From Wikipedia
693 (By Oritnk CC BY-SA 3.0, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=36792478>)

694
695 For thorough testing, different classes/groups should be assessed to model performance. For
696 example, a confusion matrix for the general population, as well as one for females and males,
697 to catch any gender bias. The testing dataset for the model should have demographic parity,
698 where every test subject has an equal chance of being selected, as well as predictive parity,
699 where subjects' predictions have equal chance. In practice, it may be difficult to get a balance
700 of all the four components of a confusion matrix. Hence, other elements of the confusion
701 matrix, like the false positive and false negative rate balance, should be considered. The false
702 positive rate balance should be similar for all groups as it ensures all applicants receive equal
703 treatment. New metrics like equalized odds allow model testing to satisfy the false positive and
704 false negative rates.

705
706 Radiologists faced with a diagnostic dilemma commonly understand the cost of under- and
707 over-diagnosis, and weigh these factors in their decision-making. For instance, a radiologist
708 reading a chest radiograph with equivocal findings for abdominal free-air will sacrifice
709 specificity due to the clinical consequences of missing pneumoperitoneum. While impacts such

710 as adverse events or social factors are not easy to model or assess, ethical algorithm creators
711 should strive to measure algorithm performance in true application beyond simple accuracy.
712 Often this will require more sophisticated statistical analysis than the typical area under the
713 curve (AUC) calculations derived from the TP, TN, FP and FN.

714 Transparency, interpretability, and explainability

715 Transparency, interpretability, and explainability are necessary to build patient and provider
716 trust. When a radiologist makes a mistake, we want to know why, in part because we want to
717 know whether the mistake is excusable. We want to know whether the mistake reflects
718 malintent or negligence, or occurred due to other factors. Similarly, if an algorithm fails or
719 contributes to an adverse clinical event or malpractice, radiologists need to be able to
720 understand why it produced the result that it did, and how it reached a decision.

721
722 Some types of AI commonly used in radiology, such as artificial neural networks, are “black
723 boxes,” and historically it has been problematic to understand why they make specific
724 decisions. This black-box approach is unacceptable for patient care, where decisions potentially
725 have high consequences.

726
727 Interpretability is the ability to understand the workings of an AI model. Explainability is the
728 ability to explain, in terms that a person understands, what happened when the model made a
729 decision. Explainability includes understanding why a model made a particular decision, or
730 appreciating conditions where the model succeeds and where it fails. Explainability includes
731 both comprehending technical aspects of algorithm structure and how outputs are presented
732 to the user [63]. In complex networked systems of AI models, users may be other AI models
733 further downstream in a cascade of decision-making machines. Explainable AI (XAI) has been
734 recognized as a core area of research, with funding opportunities from agencies such as the
735 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) [64].

736
737 For a model to be transparent, it should be both visible and comprehensible to outside viewers.
738 How transparent a model should be is debatable. Transparency might make it more susceptible
739 to malicious attacks, or reveal proprietary intellectual property.

740
741 The GDPR states that automated decision-making systems that have significant impact on a
742 person are not permitted without that person’s consent [17, 65]. It also states that the
743 individual has the right to an explanation of how the automated decision was arrived at, and
744 the consequence of that decision [66]. This has been interpreted to mean that AI decisions
745 should be able to be rationalized in human-understandable terms [67].

746

747 The radiology community needs to create guidelines for explaining as well as testing and
748 otherwise assessing AI models. These guidelines will need to consider the variety of clinical
749 applications. For example, AI built into an MRI scanner to decrease scanning times will have
750 different impacts on different patients, and potentially different technical pitfalls, than image
751 analysis algorithms. Considering the GDPR definition, is decreasing scan time a decision that
752 has a “significant impact” requiring patient consent? Does every image analysis AI decision have
753 a significant impact?

754

755 It is unclear how much of an AI solution’s inner workings radiologists have a duty to assess
756 before applying the AI in patient care, and just how transparent AI vendors should be regarding
757 the inner workings of their product. May a vendor supply a canned explanation of what their AI
758 models do, or does each radiologist need intimate knowledge of the model, and the ability to
759 explain it clearly to the patient? What represents an adequate, or good-enough, explanation?

760 Replicability

761 AI models should be replicable; the model should give the same or better result if given the
762 same input. While this seems obvious, it is in contradistinction to humans, who commonly
763 exhibit both inter- and intra-observer variability. The standard for a ML model should at least
764 match expert human performance. Replicability is problem-dependent, and the amount of
765 variability depends on the specific task at hand.

766 Algorithm bias

767 Computer-assisted decisions are dependent on the quality and accuracy of the data upon which
768 they are derived. As described in detail above, any bias in the data will have an impact on the
769 outcome, much the same way that humans can only base decisions on their own previous
770 learning.

771

772 Implementing ethics of AI within medical imaging is dependent on the continuous verification
773 of both the data and models. Deployed models will need to be monitored and re-tuned if a
774 source of bias or new information are identified. There is an opportunity to invite diverse
775 stakeholders to audit the models for bias. Mechanisms should be put in place to monitor user
776 reports and user complaints. Before model deployment, training data should be matched with
777 deployment data, and the metrics for performance thoroughly tested and used to inform real-
778 life performance.

779 Ethics of Practice

780 Computer-human interaction: Keeping humans in the loop

781 The Institute of Electrical, and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) recently stated that autonomous and
782 intelligent systems “should always be subordinate to human judgement and control”, [13],
783 which will ultimately fall to radiologists. This is certainly one way to approach AI, though it fails
784 to acknowledge the potential ability and significant benefits of autonomous AI tools.

785
786 The doctor-patient relationship is predicated on trust. As medicine increases in complexity,
787 trust extends from individual providers to larger healthcare institutions. As healthcare
788 institutions and individual practitioners implement AI, maintaining transparency will be
789 important to maintaining trust [7].

790
791 It is ethical to be transparent with patients and all stakeholders about when a decision is made
792 by, or heavily influenced by, an algorithm. This raises intriguing issues about how to have a
793 shared decision-making discussion with patients when AI is another party in decision making.

794
795 Radiologists and institutions using AI in radiology should be transparent with patients about
796 what is happening to them and their data. Patients should be made aware of:

- 797 ● The ways in which humans oversee the decisions made by AI
- 798 ● How AI is being used in diagnoses and medical recommendations that controls the
799 institution has put in place to assess, validate, and monitor the AI tools being used.

800
801 Ethical oversight must extend beyond the end users of AI tools. Those responsible for
802 developing, adapting and maintaining AI tools must also adhere to ethical principles [13].
803 Equally, those whose interests are more-focused on economic gains from AI implementation
804 (e.g., practice managers, payors, etc.) must be included in the ethical considerations and
805 decision-making. Healthcare providers are already advertising perceived benefits of AI as a
806 means of attracting patients. AI systems could very easily be programmed to guide users to
807 clinical actions designed to meet quality metric requirements, or to increase profit, without
808 necessarily conferring any benefit on patients. As complex dynamic networked systems evolve,
809 it may be difficult to attribute responsibility among different AI agents, let alone between
810 machines and humans [68].

811
812 How should oversight be maintained? Certainly there must be committees, boards, or working
813 groups tasked with scrutinizing the introduction of AI, their clinical use, and outcomes from that
814 use. Individual radiologists, through continued medical education to improve their

815 understanding of AI, can contribute by actively monitoring model performance as they use AI in
816 their daily clinical practice. A mechanism to gather, compile, and disseminate information on
817 the limitations, pitfalls, or failures of each AI model can help ensure transparency and
818 continued quality assurance and improvement.

819
820 Tasks or decisions that should not be delegated to models need to be identified, to ensure
821 human oversight and prevent potential harm to patients. Whether these oversight bodies need
822 formal legislation to mandate and maintain them will be a matter for each jurisdiction. It may
823 be sufficient for the authority of these bodies to rest within professional organizations,
824 hospitals or academic healthcare structures (once these institutions are trusted by their staff,
825 their patients, and the public). The legal question of treating autonomous AI agents differently
826 from those under direct human supervision is under consideration, and yet to be decided [69].

827 Education

828 Rather than AI replacing radiologists, technologists, and other roles in radiology, new and
829 different skills will be needed to practice AI-enabled radiology. This offers a unique opportunity
830 to reassess the essential components of radiology work and determine the optimal
831 combination of humans and AI to perform these tasks. Radiology needs research and specific
832 guidance on training and protocols for both radiologists and patients for new shared decision-
833 making paradigms. Part of this training will need to focus on the practical question of how best
834 to use the new AI tools that will be made available. But part of this training will need to focus
835 on the ethical matters that arise by virtue of employing new AI tools. Beyond the details of
836 ensuring ethical collection and use of data, and ethical development of algorithms (both of
837 which processes will be driven and controlled by relatively small numbers of individuals), there
838 are responsibilities to apply the algorithms in practical day-to-day patient care in an ethical
839 fashion, which will involve every physician whose practice uses these tools. The best way to
840 ensure that AI tools are used in an ethical fashion is to ensure that physicians who use them
841 day in and day out are made aware of the moral risks they run when using these tools. The
842 better trained radiologists are, the fewer cases of wrongdoing there will be, blameless or
843 otherwise.

844 Automation bias

845 Automation bias is the tendency for humans to favor machine-generated decisions, ignoring
846 contrary data or conflicting human decisions. The literature contains several examples of
847 automation bias that occur when humans monitor or observe decision-making machines,
848 particularly in highly complex situations [70]. Automation bias leads to misuse of decision-

849 making machines [70], including over-reliance, lack of monitoring, and blind agreement [71].
850 Automation bias in clinical decision support systems has been well reviewed [72].
851
852 Automation bias leads to errors of omission and commission. Omission errors occur when a
853 human fails to notice, or disregards, the failure of the AI tool. High decision flow rates, where
854 decisions are swiftly made on radiology exams and the radiologist is reading examinations
855 rapidly, predispose to omission errors. This is compounded by AI decisions made on the basis of
856 features that are too subtle for humans to detect. Commission errors occur when the
857 radiologist erroneously accepts or implements a machine’s decision in spite of other evidence
858 to the contrary.
859
860 Radiology has already confronted automation bias with the use of computer-aided detection
861 (CAD) algorithms in the interpretation of screening mammography, where use of CAD is FDA-
862 approved and reimbursed by Medicare. Studies have shown that the use of CAD is associated
863 with reduced accuracy of interpretation of screening mammograms with increased rate of
864 recall and biopsy [73] and even decreased sensitivity in a subset of radiologists [74]. It is
865 theorized that reduced accuracy may be related to over-reliance on or confidence in CAD
866 outputs. While AI-based CAD algorithms show much greater promise than traditional CAD in
867 experimental settings, it is not clear how the human-AI interactions would impact accuracy or
868 efficacy in actual clinical settings. This will be partially addressed through validation processes
869 like FDA approval, which will include evaluation of safety and efficacy. An element of “soft
870 governance” is also useful; AI (or other products) are unlikely to be widely purchased if they
871 cannot show compliance with accepted standards (whether required by legislation or not) [75].

872 Patient preferences

873 A poll in 2017 reported that 65% of American adults feel uncomfortable delegating the task of
874 making of a medical diagnosis to a computer with artificial intelligence [76]. Research is needed
875 to understand when and how patients will, and should, trust radiology decisions made by
876 machines.

877
878 While radiology should take into account the collective wishes of patients with respect to the
879 use of AI tools in their care, these wishes may not conform to the logic that drives AI models.
880 For example, studies about decision-making in autonomous vehicles (AVs) showed that people
881 approve of utilitarian AVs which would sacrifice their passengers for the greater good if faced
882 with a choice of running over pedestrians or sacrificing their occupants, and they would like
883 others to buy them. On the other hand, they themselves preferred to travel in AVs that protect
884 their passengers at all costs [77]. Adding complexity, recent research indicates that norms

885 surrounding AI are culturally variable across the world [78], suggesting that a one-size-fits-all
886 approach will often be impossible.

887

888 Similar ambivalence in public attitudes towards radiology AI is likely. Will the public accept
889 imperfections in AI-driven radiology as it relates to individuals, in favor of a potential greater
890 good? Or will an individual deciding for themselves or their loved ones have a much lower
891 tolerance for such imperfections? If, for example, medical imaging is purely protocol-driven,
892 and algorithm-interpreted, will there still be room for the practice of common sense, and for
893 balancing individual and population risks relating to radiation exposure against specific patient
894 expectations? If AI-driven radiology is acknowledged to be imperfect and rapidly evolving, will
895 the public accept it because it is less-costly or less-labor-intensive than human-provided
896 radiology?

897 Traceability

898 Traceability is the ability to link things, and to follow the link. It is a crucial factor to ensure
899 patients' and healthcare providers' trust in these systems. Traceability helps to detect products
900 that do not function as expected, and to assess quality control and implement corrective
901 actions.

902

903 The concept applies to multiple parts of software engineering. In radiology AI, a required
904 diagnosis field in a radiology report, such as presence or absence of disease X, could be linked
905 to an AI model that generates that categorization. Once this link is established, one can trace
906 the relationship to verify the categorization has occurred. Similarly, the categorization can be
907 traced back to the AI model that generated it. Traceability in software testing is the ability to
908 trace tests forward and backward, usually using controlled test cases, or running the AI model
909 in a controlled environment to see if it meets specifications. Traceability matrices document
910 relationships among these requirements.

911 AI and workforce disruption

912 One of the greatest fears about AI is that humans will lose their jobs because of it [75].
913 Radiologists are not immune to this possibility, nor to the fear arising from it. This could lead to
914 behaviors and practices in the future designed to ensure the continuing relevance and roles of
915 human practitioners in healthcare, regardless of whether or not continued direct human
916 involvement is of ultimate benefit to the public.

917

918 Much of the current debate about ethical issues surrounding AI usage in healthcare centers on
919 the presumption that one of the key roles of humans in implementation of AI is to prevent

920 negative consequences of this implementation. It would be perverse to ignore the possibility
921 that humans may not act disinterestedly, and that radiologists have a vested interest in
922 ensuring they are not made entirely redundant by emerging technology and artificial
923 intelligence. Furthermore, in a potential future where radiologists' position in the hierarchy is
924 threatened or diminished in favor of information scientists or other non-traditional medical
925 players, they may feel driven to protect their relevance. Not only is there an ethical imperative
926 to protect patients and the general public from the dangers of "robot-only radiology", there is
927 also a countervailing need for protection against radiologist or other physician self-interest, if it
928 conflicts with the general good.

929

930 We simply don't know how patients will interact with robust radiology AI. Parts of it may be
931 widely embraced, and other parts may generate fear and significant pushback. One described
932 behavior is labeled 'liberal eugenics,' where a subset of the population with special knowledge
933 or access to resources may use them to gain some sort of advantage. For example, they might
934 take advantage of an expensive radiology screening AI tool [79].

935 Resource inequality

936 AI requires access to large amounts of data, the technology and skills to manage those data,
937 and compute power to train and manage complex AI systems. Smaller or resource-poor
938 hospitals and academic departments may lack these capabilities. Almost certainly some
939 radiology AI will be proprietary, developed by large academic or private healthcare entities,
940 insurance companies, or large companies with data science expertise but little historical
941 radiology domain knowledge. This may exacerbate disparities in research capacity and services
942 offered.

943

944 While financial incentives must be made available to model developers to foster continued
945 research and development, thought must be given to the well-being of resource-poor
946 communities. Affordable access to models proven to improve individual and population health
947 outcomes may be attainable through government or private funding. In addition, radiologists
948 and other users of models should be cognizant of potential biases towards resource-poor
949 communities due to under-representation of certain populations or communities during the
950 training and testing processes. Awareness of these biases can promote recognition of issues as
951 they arise during the implementation and utilization of these models. To these ends, the
952 advisory groups of organizations and institutions in charge of monitoring model performance
953 should be composed of people of diverse background and expertise to ensure adequate
954 representation.

955 Liability

956 One offshoot of this issue is whether or not AI should be liable for its actions, and if so, how?
957 This is primarily a legal question, though ethics and morality affect the outcome. For the
958 moment, humans will bear ultimate responsibility and liability [68].

959
960 In considering ethics of using AI models in medical practice, one must also consider the
961 liabilities when poor patient outcomes occur. Currently, physicians, including radiologists, are
962 held liable in cases where “standard of care” are not provided. In the new era of AI-assisted
963 care, the “standard of care” is still to be determined. In cases where AI is used as a decision
964 aid, it is likely that radiologists will still be considered liable. However, as models incorporate
965 large amounts of data, some of which are not human-perceptible, the question will arise as to
966 whether physicians should still be held wholly responsible for bad outcomes or whether
967 responsibility should be shifted partly or wholly to those who produce, market, and sell models.

968
969 We need transparency for AI in radiology to have a means to evaluate whether some culpable
970 defect in the model has contributed to poor patient outcomes. Should the hospital or
971 healthcare system that implements such models be liable? In addition, what happens when
972 the poor patient outcome is result of a radiologist using his/her own best judgment against the
973 output of an AI model? Today, a question of radiologist’s liability relates to one of negligence:
974 Did the physician behave reasonably under the circumstances? With an autonomous machine
975 and no human at the controls, will the focus be on whether the computer performed as well as
976 it should have [18, 69]?

977 Conflicts of interest

978 Conflict of interest (COI) is “a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional
979 judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary
980 interest [80, 81].” With nascent, evolving markets like those involving radiology AI, it is
981 expected and quite normal that radiologists involved in patient care would also sometimes hold
982 positions in AI startups or more established commercial entities positioning themselves to
983 compete for position in healthcare. Similar to when an investigator evaluating a new drug has a
984 financial interest in its success, radiologists or administrators who have COIs related to AI
985 products may be managed through remedies such as public disclosure, institutional oversight,
986 divestment, or other measures.

987
988 In some cases, the title or position of a physician, nurse, or administrator in a healthcare system
989 may effectively render their COI as an institutional COI. Addressing this point, the American
990 Association of Medical Colleges states that in individual’s “official’s position may convey an

991 authority that is so pervasive or a responsibility for research programs or administration that is
992 so direct that a conflict between the individual's financial interests and the institution's human
993 subjects research should...be considered an institutional conflict of interest." [82]. With
994 institutional conflicts of interest, institutions may need to be creative with additional
995 independent oversight measures to prevent a loss of public confidence.

996
997 Individuals or institutions with conflicts of interest in healthcare should be vigilant to disclose
998 and manage those conflicts [83, 84]. When dealing with AI in healthcare, those in positions to
999 facilitate disclosures of patient or subject data to third parties not pursuant to patient care,
1000 purchase AI agents, or implement models in clinical workflows should be especially careful to
1001 manage their conflicts, which may in some cases require them to recuse themselves from such
1002 activities.

1003 Conclusion

1004 AI has the potential to improve radiology, help patients, and deliver more cost-effective
1005 medical imaging. AI amplifies complex ethical and societal questions for radiology. This
1006 statement is intended to inspire a collective discussion on how to incorporate AI ethically into
1007 clinical radiology practice.

1008
1009 Everyone involved with radiology AI has a duty to understand it deeply, to appreciate when and
1010 how hazards may manifest, to be transparent about them, and to do all they can to mitigate
1011 any harm they might cause. In particular, radiologists have a duty to understand both the
1012 rewards and risks of AI agents they use, to alert patients and stakeholders to risks, and to
1013 monitor AI products to guard against harm. Even given such ethical behavior, AI will cause
1014 unescapable social and economic change. Most changes will be positive, but some may be for
1015 the worse.

1016
1017 AI has dramatically altered our perception of radiology examinations and associated data ---
1018 their value, how we use them and how they may be misused. As much as understanding AI,
1019 radiologists have a moral duty to understand their data. This is not a banal sentiment.
1020 Radiologists and the radiology community have a moral duty to use the data they collect to
1021 improve the common good, extract more information about patients and their diseases, and
1022 improve the practice of radiology. Radiologists are ethically obligated to make their data useful
1023 to the patients from whom they collected it.

1024

1025 For radiology, the value of data and of AI will be more situational than absolute. The radiology
1026 community has a duty to strengthen helpful systems and institutions to provide the appropriate
1027 circumstances for ethical AI to flourish in clinical care, research, and business.

1028
1029 Radiology should start now to develop codes of ethics and practice for AI. Establishing these
1030 regulations, standards, and codes of conduct to produce ethical AI will need to balance the
1031 issues with appropriate moral concern. Ensuring ethical AI requires a desire to gain trust from
1032 all involved. Regulations, standards, and codes of conduct need to be agreed to and continually
1033 updated. We need both radiology-centric AI expertise and technology to verify and validate AI
1034 products. Paradoxically, some of this technology may contain AI. Key to these codes of conduct
1035 will be a continual emphasis for transparency, protection of patients, and vigorous control of
1036 data versions and uses. Continuous post implementation monitoring for unintended
1037 consequences and quality escapes with formal root cause and corrective action for these must
1038 be enforced.

1039
1040 Radiologists are learning about ethical AI at the same time they are inventing and using it.
1041 Technological changes in AI, and society's response to them, are evolving at a speed and scope
1042 which are hard to grasp, let alone manage. Our understanding of ethical concerns and our
1043 appropriate response to them shift constantly. AI will conceivably change every part of
1044 radiology to some degree. To do best by our patients and our communities, we have a moral
1045 obligation to consider purposefully the ethics of how we use and appreciate data, how we build
1046 and operate decision-making machines, and how we conduct our business.

1047

1048 Definitions

- 1049 ● Artificial intelligence (AI) - The science and engineering of making computers behave in
1050 ways that, until recently, were thought to require human intelligence.
- 1051 ● Machine learning (ML) - Algorithms whose performance changes, and ideally improves,
1052 as they are exposed to more data.
- 1053 ● Supervised ML - A type of ML for which the algorithm changes based on data with
1054 known labels. In clinical radiology to evaluate medical images, supervised ML is a
1055 repetitive process to match images to existing labels.
- 1056 ● Unsupervised ML - In unsupervised ML, the algorithm is fed an unlabelled dataset (i.e.
1057 one without answers). In this case the algorithm groups image findings into clusters
1058 based on one or more features it “learns”. Deep learning - A type of ML that uses
1059 multiple layers of inputs and outputs.
- 1060 ● Neural network - A subset of deep learning that has proved good at making decisions
1061 about radiology images
- 1062 ● Algorithm - Computer code that defines the actions that will be performed on input data
- 1063 ● Model - The result of training an algorithm on a dataset. Each time the same algorithm
1064 is trained on a different dataset, or a different algorithm is trained with the same
1065 dataset, a new model results. Once a model is trained, it runs much faster and requires
1066 much less compute power, as long as the input images are similar to the training
1067 dataset.
- 1068 ● Bias - A systematic deviation from the truth.
- 1069 ● Variance - A random deviation from the truth.

1070

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